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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
rIRGIL REDMOND and ED DeLYLE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants
\'S.

CITY COURT OF SALT LAKE CITY,

J. PATION NEELEY, CITY JUDGE,

Case No.
10340

WARREN M. WEGGELAND, DEPUTY
SALT LAKE COUN'rY A TI'ORNEY,
Defendants-Respondents

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Suit for writ of Mandamus to compel Salt Lake City
Judge to dismiss a criminal complaint against Appellants
because of failure of Prosecutor to furnish a Bill of
Particulars ordered by the City Court, or in the alternath·e to order prosecutor to furnish said Bill of Particulars.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
District Court refused to grant relief requested and

dismissed suit for mandamus with prejudice.

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek reversal of order dismissin
.
d
g sun ~
an amus and for an order requiring dismissal ..·
criminal complaint filed against the Plaintiff of Jt
. c
.
s Ill trt
C ity
ourt, or m the alternati\'e for an order r
the said Bill of Particulars to be furnished.
equini.

l'v1

STATEI'v1ENT OF FACTS

fi-

Both Appellants were charged with issuing a
check in a complaint issued by the City Court of s..,
Lake City. (R 1)
At their arraignment in the City Court, Appell&
filed a written motion for a Bill of Particulars. lR J, 18
The City Judge ordered the prosecution to furnish Ap.
pellants with documents and other information derilalllll
in the motion. ( R. 3, 18, 45). The Bill of Particula!
furnished by the Prosecution is merely a restatemm
of the allegations of the complaint and a refusal to tum
the information and documents which the Court ordm!
to be furnished, except that a copy of the check IDlt
tioned in the complaint was furnished to Appellants.
Although the complaint filed in the City Court apilll
Appellants involves only one check, that check ~ •
one of a series of forty or fifty checks which BPJS 1
have been uttered by the same person. (R. 43) All I
said checks were drawn on the same bank accoun~ •
made payable to the same persons, bore the same•
proximate dates, were for approximately the •
amount, were endorsed by the same person, were Ciiiis
by use of the same drivers license for identification.•
part of a numerical sequence, and appear to have-'
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.. •m ~hl' saml' pre-numbered check book. (R 51, 52, 53)
The police appear to ha\'e gathered up all of the checks
i-:'Ut'n 1:1 th1:- senes. together with the bank signature
.·,:1.i-. n;in~: n'<.·onis concerning the bank account, retumt'': l nt'l'k.- which were deposited to open that bank ac', ur.t. and nther documents demanded in the Bill of
; ':1: t 11 u!ar". The Prosecutor first agreed to furnish Ap. 1·'.:.;11b \\·1u1 l·op1es of the requested documents and then
:·1-:~1-t·d ~,,do so or to permit Appellants to inspect or copy
-:1.d .Jncuments. 1 R. 52) They have admitted that they
: .in.' them m their possession. tR. 52, 53)
B1.,c;1usP the Prosecution has gathered up the evidence
1w1'tit>d by Appellants to learn the identity of person who
.·,1shed the checks and needed to submit to hand-writing
!·xperts to 1dentif~, the persons who actually uttered and
lashed the checks in question. ( R. 48. 50). the Appellants
are unable to prepare e\'idence necessary for them to
present at the preliminary hearing to show that no pro;1ble cause exists upon which they could be bound over
to the District Court for trial.
Appellants filed in the City Court, a motion to quash
the complamt in accordance with the provision of 77-11-1
and 77-23-3. UCA, 1953. or in the alternative to compel
the Prosecutio11 to furnish the Bill of Particulars ordered
furnished by the Court. ( R. 12, 13) This motion was
heard and demed by a different City Judge. Appellants
then brought this action for a Writ of Mandamus to
compel the Court to quash the complaint or require the
Bill of Particulars to be furnished, and the The District
Court refused to grant the relief requested. From that
order this appeal is prosecuted.
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The information sought in the Bill of Particul
· ~f .th e prosecutions evidence pertaining~
an~
no t a previe~
the ~Hege~ fictitious check mentioned in the complaint
but lS evidence and facts which would ordinaril ~
available to Appellants but for the act of the prosec~tict
and the police department in gathering up that evident'!
so that it is not now available to Appellants. (R 48,
00
Respondents have admitted in their answer to~
complaint filed herein that the order requiring frt
prosecution to furnish the Bill of Particulars is still ?
full force and effect and was not overruled by the onie
of the second Judge which denied Appllants' motion~
quash, etc., and Respondents allege that the Bill d
Particulars furnished by them complied with the orde
of the Court, notwithstanding the fact that it was mere:
a refusal to comply with that order.
POINT I
ARGUMENT
APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO AN ORD!
QUASHING THE COMPLAINT BECAUSE OF FAJL
URE OF PROSECUTION TO FURNISH BILL OF PART·
ICULARS ORDERED BY THE COURT.
The City Court ordered the Prosecution to fuml
the Bill of Particulars demanded by Appellants. The JI
of Particulars furnished by the Prosecution constitull
a restatement of the wording of the complaint, a P.
copy of the check mentioned in that complaint, togedl
with the following statement in (lieu) of furnishingti
information demanded in questions 2 and 3 of the*'
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mand for a Bill of Particulars:
·Plaintiff refuses to answer questions No. 2 (No. 3) in
that defendant requests matters which are evidentiary
and be':ond the scope of a Bill of Particulars."
Appellants are entitled to the information which they
Jemanded in their motion for a Bill of Particulars and
whic.'.l the Court ordered the Prosecution to furnish, as
;ndicat.ed m 77-21-9, UCA, 1953, (which statute is made
applicable to complaints by the last paragraph of 77-11-1,
CCA, 1953, see also State v. Gunn 102 U--422 132 P2d
109 ( 1942); State v. Solomon 93U70, 71 P2d 104 (1937)
which statute reads in part as follows:
''77-21-9, BILL OF PARTICULARS.-(1) When an
information or indictment charges an offense in
accordance with the provision of section 77-21-9 but
fails to inform the defendant of the particulars of
the offense, sufficiently to enable him to prepare
his defense, or to give him such information as he is
entitled under the Constitution of this state, the
court may, of its own motion, and shall at the request
of the defendant, order the prosecuting attorney to
furinsh a bill of particulars containing such itnformation as may be necessary for these purposes; or the
prosecuting attorney may of his own motion furnish
such bill of particulars.
(2) When the court deems it to be in the interest of
justice that facts not set out in the information or
indictment or in any previous Bill of particulars
should be furnished to the defendant, it may order
the prosecuting attorney to furnish a bill of particulars containg such facts. In determining whether
such facts and, if so, what facts, should be furnished,
the court shall considered the whole record and the
entire course of the preceedings against the defend-
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ant .... "
(Emphasis added)
It should be noted that the foregoing statute vests in the

Judge the discretion of determing what "facts" should
be furnished in a Bill of Particulars in each case, and
what "particulars" are necessary to enable the accUSed
to prepare his defense. In addition, when the "interest of
justice" requires that "facts" available to the Prosecutor
be furnished to the Defendant the Court may order the
Bill of Particulars. The statute further sets a standard
to be used by the Judge in exercising that discretion in
ordering or refusing to order a given Bill of Particulars.
State v. Faux, 9 U. 2d 350, 345 P2 186 ( 1959). It is in
the sound discretion of the Court to determine if the
accused should be allowed to obtain evidence in the
possession of the prosecution. State v. Lack, 118 U. 128,
221 P. 2d 852 (1950). We must assume that in exercising
its discretion the City Court Judge, who ordered the Bill
of Particulars, complied with the requirements of 77-21-9,
UCA, 1953, and, accordingly, that the Prosecution should
be required to furnish the Bill of Particulars. In discretionary matters of this type, this Court should not
substitute its opinion for that the trial Judge unless there
is a clear abuse of discretion by the lower court.

Appellants assert that they are innocent of the charges
contained in the complaint filed in the City Court. It
cannot be reasonable or rightfully asserted that the
documents and other information ordered furnished to
Appellants in the Bill of Particulars is not necessary for
the preparation of a defense, or that the interest of justice
does not require that said information be furnished to
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,\ ellants. This information is in fact necessary to learn
~::identity of persons who can identify the persons who
actualh- cashed the checks in question and to furnish an
adequate number of handwriting specimens to a handwnting expert for him to form an opinion as to the
identity of the person or persons who uttered the checks
in question. Whenever a person is charged with an
offense which may result in a fine or imprisonment,
justice requires that he be given information to show
his innocence.
The uncontradicted fact is that the prosecutor wilfully
refused to comply with the order which required him to
furnish the Bill of Particulars, which order the prosecution admits to still be in full force and effect. (R. 18)
The remedy available to a Defendant who has not been
furnished with a sufficient Bill of Particulars when one
has been ordered is set out in 77-23-3, UCA, 1953 (Which
statute is made applicable to complaints by the last
paragraph of 77-11-1, UCA, 77-21-1 1953) and which
statute was the basis of the motion to quash filed by
Appellants, which reads in part as follow:

"77-23-3, MOTION TO QUASH-GROUNDS-A motion to quash the information or indictment shall be
available only on one or more of the following
grounds. In the case of:
( 1) Either an information or indictment:
(a) . . .
(b)

That the court has ordered a bill of Particulars
under the provisions of section 77-21-9 and
the prosecuting attorney fails to furnish a
sufficient bill. . . "
(Emphasis added)
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Appellants are not seeking an order compelling a Bill
Particulars. Such an order has been issued in the sound
discretion of the City Court and is still in full force and
effect. Appellants motions seeks an order quashing the
complaint, or in the alternative an order compelling the
prosecution to comply with the existing order of the
Court for a Bill of Particulars. The language quoted above
is quite emphatic concerning quashing of a complaint
in the event of failure of the prosecution to furnish a
"sufficient" Bill of Particulars. It is manditory, and the
Appellants are entitled, as a matter of law, to an order
quashing the complaint.
The prosecution admits that it has in its possession
all of the documents subpoenaed by the Appellants and
that the documents subpoenaed are the same as those
demanded in the Bill of Particulars. (R. 52, 53). Because
they have gathered up all these documents, the Appel.
lants have no other source from which to obtain them.
Where information is not otherwise available to an accused, it is a clear case where justice demands that it be
furnished so that an adequate defense can be presented.

POINT II
REFUSAL TO FURNISH BILL OF PARTICULARS IS
A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine
if there is sufficient cause to believe that there has been
an offense committed and to believe that the accused
is guilty thereof and accordingly should be held to ansn
thereto in the District Court. 77-15-17 and 77-15-19, UCA,

9
1953

. The accused is entitled to present witnesses and

e\·idence on his own behalf at a preliminary hearing to
show that no probable cause exists. 77-15-11, UCA, 1953.
It would be a useless formality and a denial of due
rocess of law to hold a preliminary hearing if the accused
~·ere prevented from presenting evidence and testimony
on his own behalf to explain the accusations and evidence
appearing against him. 16 Am. Jur. 2nd, Const. Law., Sec.
5~8. It would clearly be a denial of due process to require
the Appellants to be present at a preliminary hearing
when evidence necessary to prepare their defense has
been gathered up by the prosecution and withheld so
that they cannot learn the names of witnesses who might
testify as to the identity of the real criminals or who
might testify as to the appellants innocence. If prejudice
to the preparation of a defense is shown resulting from
failure to furnish a bill of particulars, the accused who
has been denied that bill has been denied due process of
law. Van Dam v. United States, 23 Fed. 2nd 235; (1928)
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 96 L. ed. 1302, (1952)

The term "due process of law" is a fundamental
principal of justice rather than a specific rule of law and
is not susceptible of more than a general statement of its
intent and meaning; accordingly, each case must be determined according to the reasonableness of the action
taken by the prosecution, the injury to the accused resulting therefrom, and whether it is necessary for the
information in the possession of the prosecution to be
disclosed to the accused so that he has an opportunity to
show that it is untrue. 16 Am .Jur 2nd., Const. Law, Sec.
340 A 51 C 545, 578.
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POINT III
THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF THE
SECUTION IN A CRIMINAL CASE IS TO SEEK~
TRUTH AND TO ADMINISTER JUSTICE AND NO'"
SOLELY TO CONVICT.
.
Although the prosecution prepared an instrument
titled "Bill of Particulars," it was completely insuffict en.
Furnishing of the checks and other documents ordered~
the court was completely refused except for the~
check mentioned in the complaint. If the Prosecuti!t
has a sufficiently strong case to justify prosecution, c
would not be weakened by discloseure of this evidence. li
their case is weak and it is necessary to conceal evito present a prima facia case, then the case should not
have been filed.
It is well recognized that it in the duty of the pro..
secutor in a criminal case to seek justice and to see tba:
fairness reigns. It is the duty of the state to seek the~
rather than to achieve a record of indiscriminate convitim
by concealment and surprise. A.B.A., Canons of Pro.
f essional Ethics, Canon 5

The attorney General of the state of Utah has by statute
been given the power and duty of supervisory contni
over county attorneys in the state in their official dutie.
67-5-1 ( 5) UCA, 1953. In exercising this power the attorney general recently (May 21, 1965) issued a~
to the Salt Lake County Attorney and others concernq
disclosure of evidence favorable to the accused. 'nl
full text of this directive is as follows:
"To all District Attorneys, County A~
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Sheriffs. and Chiefs of Police:
It was announced this day through the news media
that an assistant attorney general from this office reported yesterday before the Utah State Council on
Cnmmal Justice Administration that it would be
unethical for a defense counsel to approach a policeman assisting in a prosecution ... that is was a type
of client-counsel relationship.
Thls directive is to inform your office of the correct
position assumed by this office with respect to this
general area of the law.
There is absolutely no canon of ethics to prevent
such contact between policeman and defense counsel.
There is absolutely no client-counsel relationship
between policeman and prosecutor.
The policeman in such a capacity is nothing more
than a witness. And no prosecutor owns any witness.
A witness is a person who is to testify as to fa~
truthfully-as he has perceived them-no matter
who calls him as a witness. No honest witness will
testify that the facts are one way for the prosecution,
another way for the defense.
Too often it appears that prosecutors regard themselves as partisan attorneys, justified in excluding
evidence of matters favorable to the accused, and in
introducing all evidence which could, by any possibility, be unfavorable to the accused.
But while a prosecuting attorney is justified in
bringing out all the facts which tend to establish the
guilt of the accused, he has no right to misrepresent
facts or to create false impressions in the mind of the
jurors.
Prosecutors represent the people, and should endeavor to see, not only that an accused person is convicted, but also that the facts are fully and fairly
placed before the jury.
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It must be remembered that a fundamentan.
American concept of the law is that any perso)

accused of having committed a crime has the con~
stitutional presumption of innocence.
No person is guilty of a crime in this county unti
he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doublt. i:
If the prosecutor has sufficient legal evidence to
prove an accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
what harm to the prosecution could result by ~
disclosure of those facts?

And, if the prosecutor does not have sufficient
legal evidence to prove an accused guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, he should not prosecute.
Another constitutional right afforded an accused
is that he be confronted by his accusers.
For this right to be meaningful, and not an emptv
play on words, the defense counsel must be able ~
interrogate those accusers and all witnesses with
factual information before the actual courtroom confrontation. Otherwise, the accused might well be
deprived of a still further constitutional right, that
of being represented by counsel. For, in any reasonable fair and logical approach, an unprepared counsel
is tantamount to no counsel.
Besides, it is a law in Utah that the accused be
informed of all witnesses against him. What sense
would that law make if those witnesses could not
be interrogated? Absolutely none. So how could
a defense counsel be unethical by confronting those
witnesses?
American justice should not be decided by a game
of chance, surprise, trickery, gimmick-anything
short of full disclosure, complete fairness, and impartial witness-have no place whatsoever in the
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rocedural machinery that potentially could deprive
~ne of our citizens of his life or liberty.
The prosecution has almost every advantage. It
has its own policemen, investigators, lawyers, experts, chemist, photographers, d~tors, engineers,
and unlimited money for preparation.
An indigent accused has practically none of these
to use in his defense. Only recenly has Utah had even
a taste of public approach to this problem.
A giant step forward has been taken by the formation of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association
and the appointment of the very capable defense
lawyer, Jimi Mitsunaga, as its director.
This trial program, afforded by a grant from the
Ford Foundation must be supported and given every
reasonable opportunity to prove its value for continuation if the State of Utah is to pride itself with
any sense of fair play toward an accused.

Toward this end, it is hereby suggested to you and
the members of your organi~ation by this office, as
the Chief Law Enforcement Officer of the State of
Utah and as supervisor of all county attorneys and
district attorneys, that you adopt the above philosophy by discarding the concept of "cat and Mouse."
Please make available to all defense counsel the
names and addresses of all witness of a case known
to the prosecution, copies of all statements and photographs, exposure to examination of all physical
evidence, and any other available factual information
concerning the case.
This Directive and Suggested Procedure might
well seem drastic and severe to the dogmatic adversary of the game "Button, Button, Who's Got the

Button?"
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But to the believer in the cherished words of the
United States Constitution, it is no more than wha,
has been long overdue. It is no more than complian '
with the law.
ce
Surprisingly, perhaps-but inevitable, indeed-such
a procedure will breed respect for the law, avoid
crime behind a badge of authority, and aid in the
reduction of the alarming increase in the crime rate
of our nation.
Let us communicate often and be of assistance to
each other."
(Emphasis added)
The trend in the law is definately toward more libera;
discovery procedure in criminal cases. Permitting a liberal
discovery will "enhance, rather than diminish, the dignity
of the administration of law" and is "in accord with
enlightened administration of criminal justice. U.S. v.
Peace, 16 F.R.DD 423 (1954). In a recent Utah case this
Court permitted an accused to inspect the transcript
of the Grand Jury hearing for purpose of impeachment of
witnesses at the trial. In that decision the Court stated
that:
"the rights of an accused of a crime are in no wise
to be belittled nor ignored. The fundamental p~
of a criminal trial is not solely to convict but to seek
the truth and adminster justice." State v. Faux, 9
U. 2d 350, 345 P. 2d 186 (1959)
The City Court recognized the need of the Appellants
to secure the documents in question and ordered the
Bill of Particulars. However, the prosecution without
a valid reason continues to withhold it. This pol.icy
certainly is not in accord with the "enlightened rules rl
criminal justice."
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CONCLUSION
The court should reverse the District Court and compel
the City Court to quash the complaint charging the appellants with the issuing of a fictious check, or in the
aJternative to compel the prosecution to furnish the information which they were ordered to furnished in the
Bill of Particulars.
By doing this the interests of justice will be carried
forth and the Appellants will be able to adequately
prepare their defense for the presenting of evidence now
withheld from them in order that they may show lack
of probable cause at the preliminary hearing. Moreover,
they will be accorded their constitutional rights by being
able to present evidence in their favor so that truth might
be ascertained and justice properly administered.

Respectfuly submitted,
Ronald C. Barker
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellant&

